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Abstract—We consider wireless networks in which multiple
paths are available between each source and destination. We
allow each source to split traffic among all of its available paths,
and ask the question: how do we attain the lowest possible
number of transmissions to support a given traffic matrix? Traffic
bound in opposite directions over two wireless hops can utilize
the “reverse carpooling” advantage of network coding in order to
decrease the number of transmissions used. We call such coded
hops as “hyper-links”. With the reverse carpooling technique
longer paths might be cheaper than shorter ones. However,
there is a prisoners dilemma type situation among sources –
the network coding advantage is realized only if there is traffic
in both directions of a shared path. We develop a two-level
distributed control scheme that decouples user choices from each
other by declaring a hyper-link capacity, allowing sources to split
their traffic selfishly in a distributed fashion, and then changing
the hyper-link capacity based on user actions. We show that
such a controller is stable, and verify our analytical insights by
simulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has recently been significant interest in multihop
wireless networks, both as a means for basic Internet access,
as well as for building specialized sensor networks. How-
ever, limited wireless spectrum together with interference and
fading pose significant challenges for network designers. The
technique of network coding has the potential to improve the
throughput and reliability of multihop wireless networks by
taking advantage of the broadcast nature of wireless medium.
For example, consider a wireless network coding scheme
depicted in Figure 1(a). In this example, two wireless nodes
need to exchange packets x1 and x2 through a relay node.
On the one hand, a simple store-and-forward approach needs
four transmissions. On the other hand, the network coding
approach uses a store-code-and-forward approach in which
the two packets from the clients are combined by means of
an XOR operation at the relay and broadcast to both clients
simultaneously. The clients can then decode this coded packet
to obtain the packets they need.
Design and analysis of efficient network coding schemes for
wireless networks have recently attracted a significant interest
from the research community. Katti et al. [3] presented a
practical network coding architecture, referred to as COPE,
that implements the above idea while also making use of
overheard packets to aid in decoding. Experimental results
shown in [3] indicate that the network coding technique can
result in a significant improvement in the network throughput.
x1 ⊕ x2
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Fig. 1. (a) Wireless Network Coding (b) Reverse carpooling.
Effros et al. [4] introduced the strategy of reverse carpool-
ing that allows two information flows traveling in opposite
directions to share a path. Figure 1(b) shows an example
of two connections, from n1 to n4 and from n4 to n1 that
share a common path (n1, n2, n3, n4). The wireless network
coding approach results in a significant (up to 50%) reduction
in the number of transmissions for two connections that use
reverse carpooling. In particular, once the first connection is
established, the second connection (of the same rate) can be
established in the opposite direction with little additional cost.
The key challenge in the design of network coding schemes
is to maximize the number of coding opportunities, where a
coding opportunity refers to an event in which at least one
transmission can be saved by transmitting a combination of
the packets. Insufficient number of coding opportunities may
affect the performance of a network coding scheme and is
one of the major barriers in realizing the coding advantage.
Accordingly, the goal of this paper is to design, analyze,
and validate network mechanisms and protocols that improve
the performance of the network coding schemes through
increasing the number of coding opportunities.
Consider the scenario depicted in Figure 2. We have three
sources of traffic, each of which is aware of two paths leading
to its destination. For example, Source 3 (positioned at n5) can
send packets to its destination (located at n1) at rates x13 and x
2
3
on its two available paths. We consider the cost metric of the
system to be the number of transmissions required to support
a given traffic matrix. Under the current channel conditions,
suppose that it is cheaper for Source 3 to send all its traffic on
path (n5, n7, n1). However, notice that there is an opportunity
for reverse carpooling on a subpath (n1, n2, n5). With this
scheme, node n2 will broadcast coded packets to nodes n1 and
n5. We refer to this broadcast link as a hyper-link. Although
path (n5, n2, n1) is more expensive for Source 3, if there is
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Fig. 2. Increasing Coding Opportunities
traffic from Source 1 (located at n1) that overlaps with it at
n2, it might actually be the case that the lowest cost traffic
split in the system would entail that Source 3 should use the
hyper-link and send all its traffic using path (n5, n2, n1), while
Source 1 follows suit by using its path (n1, n2, n5, n4).
However, we immediately see that there is a prisoners’
dilemma situation here – savings can only be obtained if
there is sufficient bi-directional traffic on (n1, n2, n5). The first
mover in this case is clearly at a disadvantage as it essentially
creates the route that others can piggyback upon (in a reverse
direction). Our challenge in this paper is to design and validate
a distributed control scheme that provides an incentive to use
reverse carpooling, eliminates the first-mover disadvantage,
and hence allows the system to attain the state of lowest
possible cost to support its traffic.
A. Related Work
Network coding research was initiated by a seminal paper
by Ahlswede et al. [5] and since then attracted a significant in-
terest from the research community. Many initial works on the
network coding technique focused on establishing multicast
connections between a fixed source and a set of terminal nodes.
Li et al. [6] showed that the maximum rate of a multicast
connection is equal to the minimum capacity of a cut that
separates the source and any terminal. In a subsequent work,
Koetter and Me´dard [7] developed an algebraic framework
for network coding and investigated linear network codes for
directed graphs with cycles.
Network coding technique for wireless networks has been
considered by Katabi et al. [3]. The proposed architecture,
referred to as COPE, contains a special network coding
layer between the IP and MAC layers. In [8] Chachulski
et al. proposed an opportunistic routing protocol, referred to
as MORE, that randomly mixes packets that belong to the
same flow before forwarding them to the next hop. Sagduyu
and Ephremides [9] focused on the applications of network
coding in simple path topologies (referred to in [9] as tandem
networks) and formulate a related cross-layer optimization
problems.
Closest to our problem are [10], [11]. Das et al. [10]
propose a new framework called “context based routing” in
multihop wireless networks that enables sources to choose
routes that increase coding opportunities. They propose a
heuristic algorithm that measures the imbalance between flows
in opposite directions, and if this imbalance is greater than
25%, provides a discount of 25% to the smaller flow. This has
the effect of incentivizing equal bidirectional flows, resulting
in multiple coding opportunities. Our objective is similar, but
we develop iterated distributed decision making that trades off
a potential increase in cost of longer paths, with the potential
cost reduction due to enhanced coding opportunities. Marden
et al. [11] consider a similar problem to ours, but unlike our
focus on how to align user incentives, their focus is on the
efficiency loss of the Nash equilibrium attained. Our objective
is to design an incentive structure that would naturally result
in the system converging to the lowest cost state.
B. Main Results
The key contribution of this research is a distributed two-
level control scheme that would iteratively try to lead the
sources to discover the appropriate splits for their traffic among
multiple paths. On one level are the sources that selfishly
choose to split their traffic across available multiple paths
with costs and maximum capacities (set by the hyperlinks)
on each. On the other level, the hyperlink nodes choose
maximum capacities for paths that share that node as a
result of the sources’ decisions as well as opportunities for
network coding. Note by splitting up the dynamics in this
fashion, our algorithm is a relaxation of the original cost-
minimization problem. The iteration process continues until
the entire network has reached local minimum which, since our
formulation is convex, is also the socially optimal solution. We
show that this process is asymptotically stable. We illustrate
our approach as well as the quality of solution using numerical
experiments. The experiments indicate that: the convergence
is fast; the costs are reduced significantly upon using network
coding; more expensive paths before network coding became
cheaper and shortest paths were not necessarily optimal. Thus,
the iterative algorithm that we develop from the relaxed
formulation performs well in practice.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Our objective is to design a distributed multi-path network
coding system for multiple unicast flows traversing a shared
wireless network. We assume that the schedule of wireless
links given to us (for example, using CSMA), and hence
abstract out the interference between links. We model the
communication network as a graph G(V,E), where V is the
set of network nodes and E is the set of wireless links. For
each link (ni, nj) ∈ E, where (ni, nj) ∈ V , there exists a
wireless channel that allows node ni to transmit information
to node nj . Each link (ni, nj) is associated with a cost αij .
The value of αij captures the cost (number of transmissions)
of transmitting information at unit rate from ni to nj . Due to
a broadcast nature of the wireless channels, the node ni can
transmit to two neighbors nj and nk simultaneously at a cost
max{αij , αik}.
We assume that the network supports flows {1, 2, . . . , },
where each flow is associated with a source and destina-
tion node. Each flow i is also associated with several paths
{P 1i , P 2i , . . . } that connect its source and destination nodes.
Our goal is to build a distributed traffic management scheme
in which the source node of each flow i can split its traffic,
xi, among multiple different paths, so as to reduce the total
number of transmissions, per unit rate, required to support a
given traffic. Note that on some of these paths there might be
a possibility of network coding.
For example, consider the network depicted on Figure 2.
The network supports three flows: (i) flow 1 from n1 to n4, (ii)
flow 2 from n4 to n6, and (iii) flow 3 from n5 to n1. We denote
by xi the traffic associated with flow i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. Suppose that
the packets that belong to flow 1 can be sent over two paths
(n1, n2, n3, n4) and (n1, n2, n5, n4). We denote these paths
by P 11 and P
2
1 . The traffic split on paths P
1
1 and P
2
1 is given
by x11, x
2
1, respectively, such that x
1
1 + x
2
1 = x1. Similarly,
flow 2 can be sent over two paths P 12 = (n4, n3, n2, n6) and
P 22 = (n4, n8, n6) at rates x
1
2 and x
2
2, such that x
1
2 +x
2
2 = x2.
Finally, flow 3 can be sent over two paths P 13 = (n5, n7, n1)
and P 23 = (n5, n2, n1), at rates x
1
3 and x
2
3, with sum x3.
Note that path P 21 = (n1, n2, n5, n4) of flow 1 and path
P 23 = (n5, n2, n1) of flow 3 share two links (n1, n2) and
(n2, n5) in the opposite directions. Thus, the packets sent
along these two paths can benefit from reverse carpooling.
Specifically, node n2 can combine packets of flow 1 received
from node n1 and packets of flow 3 received from node n5.
Similarly, node n3 can combine packets of flow 1 received
from node n2 and packets of flow 2 received from node
n4. Note that the cost saving at node n2 is proportional to
min{x21, x23}, while the saving at node n3 is proportional to
min{x11, x12}. Note that our model is not restricted to reverse
carpooling type XOR coding alone. Other types of XOR
coding schemes like COPE [12], which uses “opportunistic
listening” can also be used.
The cost at node n2 when coding is enabled is
Cn2(x
2
1, x
2
3) = max{α21, α25}min{x21, x23} (1)
+α25(x21 −min{x21, x23})
+α21(x23 −min{x21, x23}).
Here, the first term on the right is the cost incurred due to
coding at node n2. This is because a coded packet from n2
is broadcast to both destination nodes, n1 and n5, and so the
cost per unit rate is max{α21, α25}. The second and third term
are “overflow” terms. Since its is possible that x21 6= x23, the
remaining flow of the larger (that cannot be encoded because
of the lack of flow in the opposite direction) is sent without
coding at the regular link cost.
The cost at node n2, given by (1), can be re-written as
shown below:
Cn2(x
2
1, x
2
3) = α25x
2
1 +α21x
2
2 +
{
max{α21, α25}
−(α21 + α25)
}
min{x21, x23}.
Using the fact that max{x1, x2} + min{x1, x2} = x1 + x2,
we obtain
Cn2(x
2
1, x
2
3) = α25x
2
1 + α21x
2
2 (2)
− min{α21, α25}min{x21, x23}.
The above equation can be interpreted as the cost at node
n2 without coding minus the savings obtained when coding is
used. Thus, the cost saved at node n2 due to network coding is
min{α21, α25}min{x21, x23} . Similarly, for node n3 the cost
saved is min{α32, α34}min{x11, x12}. The total system cost
can be expressed as:
C(X) =
3∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
βji x
j
i − min{α21, α25}min{x21, x23} (3)
− min{α32, α34}min{x11, x12},
where X = {x11, x21, x12, x22, x13, x23} is the state of the system
and βji is the uncoded path cost (equal to the sum of the
link costs on the path) j used by flow i. For example, β11 =
α12 + α23 + α34, for path P 11 = (n1, n2, n3, n4). Thus, the
first term on the right in (3) is the total cost of the system
without any coding, while the second and third terms are the
savings obtained by coding at nodes n2 and n3.
In this paper, we consider the problem of minimizing
total cost, given the traffic matrix. The problem poses major
challenges due to the need to achieve a certain degree of
coordination among the flows. For example, for the network
depicted in Figure 2, increasing of the value of x23 (the decision
made by node n5) will result in a system-wide cost reduction
only if it is accompanied by the increase in the value of x21.
III. HYPER-LINKS AND SYSTEM COST
In order to decouple the decisions of flows, we introduce
the idea of a hyper-link whose capacity can be controlled
independently of the flows that use it.
Definition 1: A hyper-link is a broadcast-link com-
posed of three nodes and two flows. A hyper-link
nk[(i, p, ni), (j, q, nj))] at node nk can encode packets be-
longing to flow i (sending packets on path p) with flow j
(sending packets on path q). Here, nodes ni and nj are the
next-hop neighbors of nk; for flow i along path p and for flow
j along path q, respectively.
For each hyper-link nk[(i, p, ni), (j, q, nj))], we introduce a
new decision variable yk that denotes the capacity of the
hyper-link. This formulation helps us to decouple the coor-
dination between individual flows. We restrict the total coded
(broadcast) traffic between the two flows at node nk to be
at-most equal to the hyper-link capacity yk. Any remaining
flow is sent without coding. Referring to Figure 2, there
exists a hyper-link h1 = n2[(1, P 21 , n5), (3, P
2
3 , n1)], where
the source node n2 can encode packets of flow f21 (flow
along path P 21 ), destined to node n3, with packets of flow
f23 (flow along path P
2
3 ), destined to node n1. Similarly,
there exists a hyper-link h2 = n3[(1, P 11 , n4), (2, P
1
2 , n2)],
where the source node n3 can encode packets of flow f11 ,
destined to node n4, with packets of flow f12 destined to
node n2. Let the hyper-link capacities be defined as y2 and
y3 respectively. The total cost of transmission on hyper-link
h1 = n2[(1, P 21 , n5), (3, P
2
3 , n1)] of capacity y2 is given by
C(h1) = max{α25, α21}y2 + (4)
α25(x21 −min{x21, y2}+
α21(x23 −min{x23, y2},
where the first term on the right is the cost of sending traffic on
the hyper-link. Note that we have to bear this cost, regardless
of whether or not there is enough bidirectional flow to be sent
on the hyper-link. This relaxation could potentially increase
the total cost of the system. However, as we will see in
Section VI, we can design a hyper-link capacity controller
which would adjust the hyper-link capacities periodically to
minimize cost. As before, the “overflow” packets are sent
without coding, and the cost incurred in doing so is given
by the latter two terms.
The cost at node n2, given by (4), can be re-written as:
C(h1) = α25x21 + α21x
2
3 − T (h1), where
T (h1) = α25 min{x21, y2}+ α21 min{x23, y2}
− max{α25, α21}y2
Recall that the first two cost terms are the total cost at node
n2 when coding is disabled. The remaining cost, T (h1), can
be thought of as the rebate obtained by using hyper-link
h1 = n2[(1, P 21 , n5), (3, P
2
3 , n1)]. Note that the rebate could
be negative (hence adding to the total cost), which might
happen when one of the flow’s rate is 0 and the other flow’s
rate is less than the hyper-link capacity.
Thus, the modified cost function when the system is in state
(X,Y ) is given by
C(X,Y ) =
3∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
βji x
j
i − (T (h1) + T (h2)), (5)
where X = {x11, x21, x12, x22, x13, x23}, Y = {y2, y3}.
T (h1) and T (h2) are the rebates obtained by using
hyper-link h1 = n2[(1, P 21 , n5), (3, P
2
3 , n1)] and h2 =
n3[(1, P 11 , n4), (2, P
1
2 , n2)]), respectively.
In general, the total system cost in terms of number of
transmissions required to support a given traffic load, when
the state of the system is (X,Y ), is:
C(X,Y ) = Total system cost without coding
− Total rebate of all the hyper-links (6)
We focus on minimizing this total cost. To this end, we relax
the problem into two sub-problems–that of traffic splitting by
sources, and that of hyper-link capacity selection:
1) Traffic Splitting: In this phase, the source node of each
flow splits its traffic among the different options, for a
given hyper-link state Y . The options available to each
flow are called hyper-paths, where each such hyper-path
contains zero or more hyper-links. We model this phase
as a potential game; the background needed is presented
in Section IV. Details of our game model and the payoffs
used are covered in Section V.
2) Hyper-Link Capacity Control: In this phase, we ad-
just the hyper-link capacities in order to minimize the
total cost. We use a simple gradient descent controller
to attain minimum cost. In this phase it is assumed
the sources attain Wardrop equilibrium instantaneously.
Further details on the type of controller used and the
convergence properties are covered in Section VI.
We call our controller as Decoupled Dynamics. The two phases
operate at different time scales. Traffic splitting is done at
every small time scale and the hyper-link capacity control is
done at every large time scale. Thus, sources attain equilibrium
for a given hyper-link capacities, then the hyper-link capacities
are adjusted, and this in turn forces the sources to change their
splits. This process continues until the source splits and hyper-
link capacities converge.
IV. BACKGROUND: POTENTIAL GAMES
Below we review some game-theoretic ideas that will be
used in this paper. Detailed discussion may be found in [13].
A population game G, with F non-atomic populations of
players is defined by a mass and a strategy set for each
population and a payoff function for each strategy. By a non-
atomic population, we mean that the contribution of each
member of the population is infinitesimal. We denote the set of
populations by F = {1, ..., F}, where F ≥ 1. The population
i has mass xi. The set of strategies for population i is denoted
Si = {1, ..., Si}. These strategies can be thought of as the
actions that members of i could possibly take. A particular
strategy distribution is the way the population i partitions itself
into the different actions available, i.e., a strategy distribution
for i is vector of the form ~xi = {x1i , x2i , ...xSii }, where∑Si
p=1 x
p
i = xi. The set of strategy distributions of a popula-
tion i ∈ F , is denoted by Xi = {~xi ∈ RSi+ :
∑Si
p=1 x
p
i = xi}.
We denote the vector of strategy distributions being used by
the entire population by X = {~x1, ~x2, ..., ~xF }, where ~xi ∈ Xi.
The vector X can be thought of as the state of the system.
Let the space of all strategy distributions be X .
The marginal payoff function (per unit mass) obtained from
strategy p ∈ Si by users of class i, when the state of the
system is X is denoted by F pi (X) ∈ R and is assumed to
be continuous and differentiable. Note that the payoffs to a
strategy in population i can depend on the strategy distribution
within population i itself. The total payoff to users of class i
is then given by
∑Si
p=1 F
p
i (X)x
p
i , where we assume linearity
for exposition.
Potential games are a type of population games, that have
a specific structure on the cost function. The idea behind
potential games is to identify a scalar function that represents
the “energy” of the system (exactly like a Lyapunov function
[14]), which is called the potential function. All information
regarding the payoffs obtained by users of a population class
can be captured in the potential function.
Definition 2: Let G be a population game with payoff
function (per unit mass) F : X → RF . G is called a Potential
Game if there exists a continuously differentiable function
T : X → R such that
∂T
∂xpi
(X) = F pi (X) (7)
∀i ∈ F and p ∈ Si, where X ∈ X is the state of the system.
The function T is called the potential function for game G.
Next, we define the concept of equilibrium in population
games. A commonly used concept in non-cooperative games in
the context of infinitesimal players, is the Wardrop equilibrium
[15]. Consider any strategy distribution ~xi = [x1i , ..., x
Si
i ].
There would be some elements which are non-zero and others
which are zero. We call the strategies corresponding to the
non-zero elements as the strategies used by population i.
Definition 3: A state Xˆ is a Wardrop equilibrium if for any
population i ∈ F , all strategies being used by the members
of i yield the same marginal payoff to each member of i,
whereas the marginal payoff that would be obtained is lower
for all strategies not used by population i.
Let Sˆi ⊂ Si be the set of all strategies used by population i
in a strategy distribution Xˆ. A Wardrop equilibrium Xˆ is then
characterized by the following relation:
F si (Xˆ) ≥ F s
′
i (Xˆ) ∀s ∈ Sˆi and s′ ∈ Si
The above concept refers to an equilibrium condition; the
question arises as to how the system actually arrives at such
a state. A commonly used kind of population dynamics is
Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) Dynamics [16]. The dynam-
ics are described as follows:
x˙pi =
xiγpi − xpi Si∑
j=1
γji
 (8)
where, γpi = max
F pi − 1xi
Si∑
j=1
F ji x
j
i , 0

Note that the total mass of the population i is a constant xi.
An interesting property of BNN dynamics is non-complacency,
i.e., it allows extinct strategies to resurface, so that its station-
ary points are always Wardrop equilibria [13].
V. TRAFFIC SPLITTING:
MULTI-PATH NETWORK CODING (MPNC) GAME
We model the traffic-splitting process of our Decoupled
Dynamics controller as a potential game, G, which we refer to
as the Multi-Path Network Coding Game (MPNC Game). Our
system model consists of a set of nodes N = {n1, . . . , nN},
where each node ni ∈ N is surrounded by a random number
of other nodes. The cost of transmission (per unit rate) from
node ni to its neighboring node nj is a constant and is equal
to αij , similarly, cost of transmission (per unit rate) from nj
to ni is αji. There exists a set of flows (these correspond to
players in the game) F = {1, . . . , F}. Each flow, i ∈ F is
defined as a tuple (nsi , n
d
i , xi), where n
s
i ∈ N is the source
node, ndi ∈ N is the destination node, and xi packets/sec is the
traffic sent from source to destination. This traffic is equivalent
to the population mass in the population game interpretation.
Each flow i is associated with a set of hyper-paths Si.
Definition 4: A hyper-path p ∈ Si between source nsi and
destination ndi is a virtual path over a physical path between
nsi and n
d
i . A hyper-path contains zero or more hyper-links on
it and at each node on the underlying physical path there can
be at-most one hyper-link. It follows that the set of all paths
are a subset of the hyper-paths.
In other words, a hyper-path can have a combination of at-most
two flows at each node. A flow can split its traffic among the
hyper-paths available to it, and we denote a sub-flow fpi of
flow i by the tuple (nsi , n
d
i , p, x
p
i ). Here, x
p
i is the traffic sent
by flow i on hyper-path p. The sum of link costs (per unit
rate) on the physical path corresponding to the hyper-path is
denoted βpi . Note that the cost seen by a sub-flow using such a
hyper-path might be lower than this cost due to saving attained
by network coding.
We represent the division of traffic xi of flow i ∈ F , over
all the hyper-paths p ∈ Si as a vector, ~xi = {x1i , . . . , xSii }
such that
∑Si
p=1 x
p
i = xi. ~xi is called the strategy distribution
of flow i, and the set of all the strategy distributions of all
the flows is called the state of the flows and is represented as
X = [~x1 . . . ~xF ]. We denote the set of all states of the system
as X, i.e., X ∈ X.
The set of all hyper-links in the network is assumed to be
pre-determined and is represented by H = {1, . . . ,H}, where
H is the number of hyper-links. Recall that the hyper-link
formed by encoding packets that belong to flows i and j, for
i, j ∈ F at node nk is represented by nk[(i, p, ni), (j, q, nj)].
Nodes ni and nj are the next hop nodes for the hyper-path
of flows i and j, using hyper-paths p and q respectively. Note
that we have slightly modified the definition to include the fact
that i and j are using hyper-paths. We denote by Hpi ⊆ H the
set of all hyper-links associated with flow fpi .
Each hyper-link can choose its capacity independently
of others. We denote the capacity of the hyper-link h =
nk[(i, p, ni), (j, q, nj)] by yh packets/sec. The hyper-link
broadcasts packets received at node nk to ni and nj up to
capacity yh. The vector of all hyper-link capacities is called
the hyper-link state and is denoted by, Y = [y1, . . . , yH ]. Let
Y be the set of all possible hyper-link states, i.e., Y ∈ Y. The
state of the system is defined as (X,Y ), where X ∈ X is the
state of the flows and Y ∈ Y is the state of the hyper-links.
In the traffic splitting phase of our algorithm, flows try to
attain the state of lowest cost for a given hyper-link state
Y . The hyper-link capacities are controlled in the next phase
(hyper-link capacity control), discussed in Section VI
The payoff (per unit rate) obtained in using hyper-path
p ∈ Si of flow i ∈ F when the state of the system
is (X,Y ) is denoted by F pi (X,Y ) ∈ R and is assumed
to be continuous and differentiable. We may have to make
suitable approximations on cost functions to ensure that these
conditions hold. We model our system as a potential game,
using the total cost function C(X,Y ) as our potential function.
Recall from (6) that the total cost of the system is
C(X,Y ) =
∑F
i=1
∑Si
p=1 β
p
i x
p
i −
∑H
h=1 T (h), (9)
where
T (h) = αki min{xpi , yh}+ αkj min{xqj , yh}
−max{αki, αkj}yh (10)
As can be seen from (10), the cost function contains “min”
terms over the hyper-link capacity and the flow rates, this
makes the function non-continuous and non-differentiable. In
order to have a continuously differentiable cost function we
approximate these “min” terms using a generalized mean-
valued function.
Let a = {a1, . . . , an} be the set of positive real numbers
and let r be some non-zero real number. Then the generalized
r-mean of a is given by:
Mr(a) =
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
ari
)
(11)
The “min” function over the set a is approximated using
Mr(a) as:
min{a1, . . . , an} = lim
r→−∞Mr(a) (12)
Substituting for Mr (11, instead of the “min” function in (9
we get the approximated total cost function as:
C˜(X,Y ) =
∑F
i=1
∑Si
p=1 β
p
i x
p
i −
∑H
h=1 T˜ (h), (13)
where for a hyper-link h = nk[(i, p, ni), (j, q, nj)] ∈ H:
T˜ (h) = αki
(
(xpi )
r+(yh)
r
2
) 1
r
+ αkj
(
(xpi )
r+(yh)
r
2
) 1
r
−max{αki, αkj}yh (14)
The cost function C˜(X,Y ) is continuous and differentiable.
So, we use the approximated cost function as our potential
function. Thus, it follows from the definition of potential
games ( 2) that, the payoff obtained by flow i ∈ F in using
option p ∈ Si is:
F pi (X,Y ) =
∂C˜(X,Y )
∂xpi
∀i ∈ F , p ∈ Si (15)
= βpi −
∑
h∈Hpi
∂T˜ (h)
∂xpi
, (16)
where, from (14)
∂T˜ (h)
∂xpi
=
αki
2
(
xpi
Mr(x
p
i , yh)
)r−1
(17)
Recall that
Mr(x
p
i , yh) =
(
(xpi )
r + (yh)r
2
) 1
r
. (18)
Hence,
F pi (X,Y ) = β
p
i −
∑
h∈Hpi
αki
2
(
xpi
Mr(x
p
i ,yh)
)r−1
, (19)
where Hpi is the set of all hyper-links associated with sub-flow
fpi . Note, the payoff is the cost incurred in using an option,
so the players try to minimize their cost. The source node of
each flow, i ∈ F , observes the marginal cost, F pi , obtained in
using a particular option, p ∈ Si, and changes the mass on that
particular option,xpi , so as to attain Wardrop equilibrium [15].
The source nodes use BNN dynamics (8) to control the mass
on each option. But since each source tries to minimize its
payoff, we use a modified version BNN dynamics:
x˙pf =
xfγpf − xpf Sf∑
j=1
γjf
 , (20)
where, γpf = max
 1xf
Sf∑
j=1
F jfx
j
f − F pf , 0

In the next section, we prove the stability of our system using
Lyapunov theory.
A. Convergence of MPNC Game
We show in this section that the multi-path network coding
game converges to a stationary point when each source uses
BNN dynamics. We will use the theory of Lyapunov func-
tions [14] to show that our population game G, is stable for a
given hyper-link state Yˆ . We use the approximated total cost
of the system (13) as our Lyapunov function.
Theorem 1: The system of flows F that use BNN dynamics
with payoffs given by (19) is globally asymptotically stable for
a given hyper-link state Yˆ .
Proof: We use the approximated total cost function
C˜(X,Y ) (13) as our Lyapunov function. It is simple to verify
that the cost function C˜(X, Yˆ ), is non-negative is convex, and
hence is a valid candidate. For a given hyper-link state, Yˆ , we
define our Lyapunov function as:
LYˆ (X) = C˜(X, Yˆ ) (21)
From (15)
∂LYˆ (X)
∂xpf
=
∂C˜(X, Yˆ )
∂xpf
= F pf (X, Yˆ ). (22)
Hence,
L˙Yˆ (X) =
∑F
f=1
∑Sf
p=1
∂LYˆ (X)
∂xpf
x˙pf (23)
=
∑F
f=1
∑Sf
p=1 F
p
f (X, Yˆ )x˙
p
f (24)
From (20) we can substitute the value for x˙pf and we have
L˙Yˆ (X) =
F∑
f=1
Sf∑
p=1
F pf (xfγ
p
f − xpf
Sf∑
j=1
γjf )
=
F∑
f=1
xf
 Sf∑
p=1
FPf γ
p
f −
 1
xf
Sf∑
p=1
F pf x
p
f
 Sf∑
j=1
γjf
 (25)
We define
F¯f ,
1
xf
Sf∑
p=1
F pf x
p
f
=⇒
F∑
f=1
xf
 Sf∑
p=1
FPf γ
p
f −
Sf∑
j=1
F¯fγ
j
f
 (26)
=
F∑
f=1
xf
 Sf∑
p=1
γpf (F
P
f − F¯f )
 (27)
≤ −
F∑
f=1
xf
 Sf∑
p=1
(γpf )
2
 ≤ 0 (28)
Thus,
L˙Yˆ (X) ≤ 0, ∀ X ∈ X (29)
where equality exists when the state X corresponds to the
stationary point of BNN dynamics. Hence, the system is
globally asymptotically stable.
B. Efficiency
The objective of our system is to minimize the total cost
for a given load vector ~x = [x1, . . . , xQ] and given hyper-
link state Yˆ . Here the total cost in the system is C˜(X, Yˆ )
and is defined in (9). This can be represented as the following
constrained minimization problem:
min
X
C˜(X, Yˆ ) (30)
subject to:
Si∑
p=1
xpi = xi ∀ i ∈ F (31)
xpi ≥ 0.
The Lagrange dual associated with the above minimization
problem, for a given Yˆ is
LYˆ (λ, h,X) = maxλ,h minX
(
C˜(X, Yˆ ) − (32)
F∑
i=1
λi
( Si∑
p=1
xpi − xi
)
−
F∑
i=1
Si∑
p=1
hpi x
p
i
)
where λi and hip ≥ 0 , ∀ i ∈ F and p ∈ Si, are the dual
variables. Now the above dual problem gives the following
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions:
∂LYˆ
∂xpi
(λ, h,X?) = 0 ∀ i ∈ F and p ∈ Si (33)
and
hpi x
?p
i = 0 ∀ i ∈ F and p ∈ Si (34)
where X? is the global minimum for the primal problem (30).
Hence from (33) we have, ∀ i ∈ F and ∀ p ∈ Si,
∂C˜
∂xpi
(X?, Yˆ )− λi
∂(
∑Si
p=1 x
?p
i − x?i)
∂xpi
+ hpi = 0
⇒ ∂C˜
∂xpi
(X?, Yˆ ) = λi + h
p
i (35)
⇒ F pi (X?, Yˆ ) = λi + hpi (36)
where the last equation follows from the definition of potential
games (2).
From (34), it follows that
F pi (X
?, Yˆ ) = λi when x
?p
i > 0 (37)
and
F pi (X
?, Yˆ ) = λi + h
p
i when x
?p
i = 0 (38)
∀ i ∈ F and ∀ p ∈ Si. The above condition (37, 38), implies
that the payoff on all the options used is identical and for
options not in use the payoff is more, which is equivalent to
the definition of Wardrop equilibrium (3). Notice, we use a
modified definition of Wardrop equilibrium, since each source
tries to minimize it’s cost (or payoff).
We have the following theorem that proves the efficiency
of our system.
Theorem 2: The solution of the minimization problem in
(30) is identical to the Wardrop equilibrium of the non-
cooperative potential game G.
Proof: Consider the BNN dynamics (20), at stationary
point, X˜ , we have x˙pi = 0, which implies that either,
Fˆi = F
p
i (X˜, Yˆ ) (39)
or xˆpi = 0,
where, Fˆi , 1xˆi
∑Q
r=1 xˆ
r
iF
r
i (X˜, Yˆ ) ∀ i ∈ F , (40)
The above expressions imply that, all the hyper-paths used by
a particular flow, i ∈ F , will yield same payoff, Fˆi, while
hyper-paths not used (xpi = 0) would yield a payoff higher
than Fˆi.
We observe that the conditions required for Wardrop equi-
librium are identical to the KKT first order conditions (37)-
(38) of the minimization problem (30) when
Fˆi = λi ∀ i ∈ F
It follows from the convexity of the total system cost that, there
is no duality-gap between the primal (30) and the dual (32)
problems. Thus, the optimal primal solution is equal to optimal
dual solutions, which is identical to the Wardrop equilibrium.
VI. HYPER-LINK CAPACITY CONTROL
Thus far we have designed a distributed scheme that would
result in minimum cost for a given hyper-link state or capac-
ities Y and for a given load vector ~x = {x1, . . . , xf}. In this
phase of Decoupled Dynamics, the hyper-link capacities are
adjusted based on the current system cost so as to guarantee
a minimum total system cost for a given load vector ~x. This
phase runs at a larger time-scale as compared to the traffic
splitting phase described in Section V. It is assumed that
during this phase all the flows or players remain in equilibrium,
i.e., changing the hyper-link capacities would force all the
source nodes to attain Wardrop equilibrium instantaneously.
The hyper-link capacity control can be formulated as a
centralized convex optimization problem as follows:
min
Y
H(Y ) (41)
subject to, yh ≥ 0 ∀yh ∈ Y and ∀h ∈ H
where, H(Y ) is the minimum total cost of the system for a
given hyper-link state Y , i.e., H(Y ) = C˜(X?, Y ), where, for
a given Y , X? is an optimal state of the flows that results in
minimum cost.1 We use a simple gradient controller defined
below:
y˙h = −κ∂H(Y )
∂yh
∀yh ∈ Y (42)
The partial derivative, ∂H(Y )∂yh , is over the variables yh ∈ Y .
Changing the hyper-link capacity yh, of some hyper-link
h ∈ H, would result in a different state of the flows, X?h
and hence a different minimum cost, C(X?h, Yh), where Yh
corresponds to the changed hyper-link capacity of yh while
other capacities are fixed, as compared to Y . Thus for a hyper-
link, h = nk[(f
p
i , ni), (f
q
j , nj)] with capacity yh,
∂H(Y )
∂yh
= ∂C˜∂yh (X
?, Y ) +
∑F
i=1
∑Si
p=1
∂C˜
∂xpi
(X?, Y )∂x
p
i
∂yh
(43)
= ∂C˜∂yh (X
?, Y ) +
∑F
i=1 Fi
∑Si
p=1
∂xpi
∂yh
where, the last expression follows from the definition of F pi
(15) and the fact that, for changes in the hyper-link state, the
sources attain Wardrop equilibrium instantaneously. In other
words, before and after a small change in yh the system is in
Wardrop equilibrium. Hence, F pi = Fi ∀i ∈ F and ∀p ∈ Si.
Finally,
∑Si
p=1
∂xpi
∂yh
= 0 since, the total load xi =
∑Si
p=1 x
p
i is
fixed.
⇒ ∂H(Y )
∂yh
= ∂C˜∂yh (X
?, Y ) = − ∂T˜∂yh (h) (44)
where, from (14), for hyper-link h = nk[(f
p
i , ni), (f
q
j , nj)],
∂T˜
∂yh
(h) = αki2
(
yh
Mr(x
p
i ,yh)
)r−1
+ αkj2
(
yh
Mr(x
q
j ,yh)
)r−1
−max{αki, αkj}
Recall, Mr(x
p
i , yh) =
(
(xpi )
r+(yh)
r
2
) 1
r
Theorem 3: At the large time-scale, the hyper-link capacity
control with dynamics (44) is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof: We use the following Lyapunov function
Z(Y ) = V (Y )− V (Yˆ ) (45)
where V (Y ) = κH(Y ) (46)
1Notice, there could be many different states, X?, which result in a
minimum cost but the minimum value, C˜(X?, Y ), is unique.
which is strictly convex, with Yˆ is the hyper-link state which
results in minimum cost H(Y ). Differentiating Z(Y ) we
obtain
Z˙ =
H∑
h=1
∂V
∂yh
y˙h. (47)
Then from (46) and (44)
∂V
∂yh
= κ
∂H(Y )
∂yh
y˙h = y˙hyh (48)
∴ Z˙ =
F∑
h=1
y˙2h
yh
≤ 0 ∀ Y, (49)
with Z˙ = 0 at the stationary points of the system. Thus, the
system is globally asymptotically stable [14].
Finally, it’s not hard to show that the equilibrium conditions
of the controller (44) are the same as the KKT conditions of
the optimization problem (41). Hence, the controller succeeds
in minimizing the total cost of the system for a given load ~x
into the system. Thus, the system state converges to a local
minimum. Now, since the global cost minimization problem
under the min approximation is convex, the solution is the
global minimum of the relaxed problem.
VII. SIMULATIONS
We simulated our system in Matlab to show system con-
vergence. We first performed our simulations for our simple
network shown in Figure 2. The load at the source nodes 1,
2 and 3 is given as 4.73, 2.69 and 3.56 respectively. We use
the following costs on the individual links (αij): α12 = 2.8,
α23 = 1.6, α34 = 1.8, α25 = 1.3, α54 = 2.1, α26 = 1.7,
α48 = 2.9, α86 = 2.2, α57 = 1.9, α71 = 2.6; we assume the
costs on the links are symmetric. We use the approximated cost
function (13), with a value of r = −100 for the approximation
parameter (12) for our simulations. The simulation is run for
50 large time scale units, and in each large time scale we have
20 small time units.
We compare the total cost of the system for the following
scenarios:
1) Decoupled Dynamics: This is the algorithm that we
developed; we use our hyper-links to decouple the flows
that participate in coding.
2) Coupled Dynamics (no hyper-link): Here, there is cou-
pling between individual flows and coding happens at
the minimum rate of the constituent flows. We use
similar game dynamics as that was used in DD. The
total cost is specified in Equation (3).
3) No Coding: In this system no network coding is used.
4) LP Optimal: This is a centralized solution. We formu-
lated our system as a Linear Program (LP) of minimizing
cost (9) over X and Y for a given load vector that we
obtain using an LP-solver.
As seen in the Figure 3, the total cost of the system (number
of transmissions per unit rate) for our model (decouples using
hyper-link) is close to the optimal solution obtained by solving
it in a centralized fashion.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of total system cost (per unit rate), for different systems:
DD, CD and non-coded against LP.
Variable x11 x
2
1 x
1
2 x
2
2 x
1
3 x
2
3 y2 y3
LP 2.69 2.04 2.69 0.00 0.00 3.56 3.56 2.69
DD 2.37 3.35 2.67 0.01 0.02 3.54 3.24 2.49
CD 4.70 0.02 0.07 2.61 0.03 3.52 NA NA
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF STATE VARIABLES FOR LP AND DD AND CD.
For this simple network we compared the final system state
of DD and CD with that of the solution obtained using LP. We
observe from Table II that the values for the split (X) and the
hyper-link capacities (Y ) generated by DD are near-optimal,
but CD is very different.
Next, we perform our simulations on a bigger topology
shown in Figure 4. This network consists of 30 nodes shared
by 6 flows. Flows 1, 2, 3 and 6 have two hyper-paths and
flows 4 and 5 have three hyper-paths. There are 6 hyper-links
in the system. Our results are shown in Table II. We observe
that DD performs near-optimally and significantly ouperforms
CD in terms of total cost.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We consider a wireless network with given costs on arcs,
traffic matrix and multiple paths. The objective is to find
the splits of traffic for each source across its multiple paths
in a distributed manner leveraging the reverse carpooling
technique. For this we relax to problem into two sub-problems,
and propose a two-level distributed control scheme set up as
a game between the sources and the hyperlink nodes. On one
level, given a set of hyperlink capacities, the sources selfishly
choose their splits and attain a Wardrop equilibrium. On the
other level, given the traffic splits, the hyperlinks may slightly
increase or decrease their capacities using a steepest descent
algorithm. We construct a Lyapunov function argument to
show that this process asymptotically converges, although
performed selfishly in a distributed fashion.
case LP DD CD
1 1293.3437 1298.3194 1325.0618
2 1550.4593 1563.7340 1625.06315
3 1624.6393 1638.4021 1642.8801
4 1826.8595 1837.1489 1865.6998
TABLE II
TOTAL SYSTEM COST COMPARISON OF DECOUPLED DYNAMICS(DD) AND
COUPLED DYNAMICS (CD) AGAINST THE LP SOLUTION.
n1 n2 n3 n4 n5
n6 n7 n8 n9 n10
n11 n12 n13 n14
n15 n16 n17 n18
n21
n19 n20
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n22 n25n24n23
n27 n28 n29 n30
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Fig. 4. Network topology.
We performed several numerical studies and found that our
two-level controller converges fast to the optimal solutions.
Some of the bi-products of our experiments were that: more
expensive paths before network coding became cheaper and
shortest paths were not necessarily optimal. In conclusion,
from a methodological standpoint we have a distributed con-
troller that achieves a near-optimal solution when the individ-
uals are self-interested.
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